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CRIMINAL LAW
'"LAW AND ORDER" AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
CONSTANCE BAKER MOTLEY*
The sharp increase in drug-related crimes on
the streets of our cities in the past few years has
made the phrase "law and order" a household
refrain. Every candidate running for public office
promises to curb "street crime" 1 by restoring
"law and order" in the community. To most of
these public office seekers, as well as those already
in office, the key to such restoration is greatly in-
creased prison terms, including life sentences, for
those involved in the illegal sale of narcotics and
for those illegal narcotics users who commit
violent crimes. And the crux of these harsh new
proposals is that such prison terms should be
mandatory. In addition, these proposals would
deny persons convicted of narcotics offenses the
usual opportunity for parole.2 Some state legisla-
tive proposals have gone so far as to prohibit plea
bargaining in such cases.3 In short, retribution
and deterrence, a theory of severe mandatory
punishment for law violators, as opposed to any
other theory or program for curbing the sale of
drugs and decreasing drug-related crimes, has
seized the day.
The only certain consequence of this oversimpli-
fied approach to a multifaceted problem is that
* District Judge, United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York. This article is an
adaptation of a speech delivered by Judge Motley as
part of The Rosenthal Foundation Lecture Series at
Northwestern University School of Law in April, 1973
and will be published by Northwestern University
Press sometime in the future as part of the Rosenthal
series.
1 New York Times, Jan. 26, 1973, at 18, col. 1.
2 See, e.g., New York State Senate Bill No. 1365
(identical to N.Y. Assembly Bill No. 1556) which was
described by Governor Rockefeller in a speech before
the New York State Legislature on January 3, 1973.
The proposal contained harsh mandatory sentences for
certain drug offenses and, in § 3 of the bill, made certain
drug offenders ineligible for parole. On April 13, 1973,
the Governor announced that he was modifying the
proposed bill to permit parole even in cases of manda-
tory life sentences after a required minimum period of
imprisonment. The mandatory period would vary
with the degree of the offense.
3New York State Senate Bill No. 1365, §§ 12-13.
Governor Rockefeller also modified this approach in
his message of April 13, 1973.
the judge alone, of all those involved in the ad-
ministration of criminal justice, would be entirely
stripped of his or her discretion in dealing with
narcotics sellers and narcotics-related offenders.
4
A bar to plea bargaining would circumscribe the
prosecutor's discretion in this one area. The re-
mainder of the prosecutor's broad discretion as
well as the discretion of all other principals in the
criminal justice system-the police, the jury, the
jailer--would remain intact. The prohibition
against parole would mean that the parole board
stage of the criminal justice process would be
completely eliminated with respect to narcotics
crimes. And all other crimes, except those few
carrying mandatory penalties, would remain
subject to a wide, largely unrestrained discretion
which the law reposes in the prosecutor, the trial
judge and the parole board. 5 In other words,
there is another, perhaps even more significant,
"law and order" problem in our system of criminal
justice of which the public is not so aware. Need-
less to say, this is a problem which deserves as
much attention, if not more, than crime in the
streets. For those who have been all the way
through our criminal justice system, including
prison, the lawlessness of the system must be a
major contributing factor to their inability to ac-
cept lawful conduct as a meaningful alternative
way of life.'
Our criminal justice system, from beginning to
end, lacks "law and order" to a substantial degree.
As noted before, officials at each critical stage of
4 See generally M. FAuXEw, CRniNAL SENTENcEs
(1972); Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the
Police and Sentencing Processes, 75 HAv. L. Rxv, 904,
916 (1962).
5 Governor Rockefeller recently amended his
proposal to extend minimum mandatory penalties to
other crimes including arson, burglary, rape, and
robbery.
6S. RuniN, H. WEmoFEN, G. EDw.nns & S.
RosENzwEIG, TnE LAW OF CRIMNAL CoRREcTroN 132
(1963); McCleery, Authoritarianism and the Belief
Systems of Incorrigibles, in T PRisoN 260, 268-69
(D. Cressey ed. 1961); Kirby, Doubts About the Indeter-
minate Sentence, 53 JuDICATuRE 63 (1969).
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the criminal justice process have and exercise
discretion. Too often it is a wide, largely uncon-
trolled discretion or one which is inadequately
guided The current proposals relating to the
narcotics epidemic mindlessly seek to strip or
control only certain officials in the exercise of
their discretion in this limited area, whereas, the
real need today is for the development of dearly
articulated standards which will more effectively
control, rather than abolish, the exercise of discre-
tion by all those officials to whom society has
delegated the authority to determine whether an
individual shall be deprived of his or her liberty.
My plan is to examine first the various stages
in our criminal justice system with a view toward
elucidating the problem of the lack of adequate
standards to guide the exercise of discretion by
officials as they function at the various stages of
our criminal justice process. Then I shall present
one view as to how more law and order may be
brought to bear on the sentencing phase of the
criminal justice process, the stage with which I
am most familiar.
THE Six STAGES o Tl E CRMINAL
JUSTICE PROCESS
It is now a criminal justice axiom that very,
very few persons who actually violate the law are
caught, still fewer are actually arrested, and even
fewer are prosecuted and convicted. Thus, a minute
percentage of all those guilty of some infraction
of the law are actually imprisoned.9 But for those
who are, the criminal justice system may be fairly
divided into six parts: the arrest, the indictment,
the trial, the sentence, prison, and then parole.
So-called street crime today takes many forms:
7 See M. FRANEL, supra note 4; Amsterdam, The
Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal
Cases, 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 785 (1970); Kadish, supra
note 4.
8 New York State Judge Irwin Brownstein recently
sentenced two youths to a life sentence with a manda-
tory minimum of fifteen years for acting as carriers of
a quantity of heroin. As Judge Brownstein pointed out
in a public statement, if the quantity had been just a
little less, he could have given the defendants a lesser
sentence as he desired to do, since the defendants
claimed that they did not know what was in the
package.
9U.S. Justice Dept. F.B.I., U~iqoRm Cnrn% RE-
PoRTs (1971). Of the 2,928,865 offenses reported during
1971 and included in the Reports, 574,584 (19 percent)
were cleared (a crime is cleared when the police identify
the offender, have sufficient evidence to charge him, and
take him into custody). Considering the offenses in-
dexed during 1971, 141,726 (4.8 percent of all index
offenses reported) persons were found quilty as charged.
there is the teenage pocketbook snatcher, the
mugger, the addict with a knife, the small nar-
cotics pusher, the addict pusher, the small soft-drug
pusher, the addict who steals social security and
welfare checks from hallway mailboxes, as well
as the major narcotics and soft-drug pushers.
Generally speaking, it is expected that the police-
men on the beat will arrest these and other street
criminals. These are the offenders against whom
the public's rage is presently directed. The fact that
hundreds of millions of dollars worth of securities
have been and are being stolen, that securities
frauds now are astronomical, that the market
may be flooded with dangerous drugs and adul-
terated foods, that consumer frauds may be "out
of sight," and that government at every level may
be losing the battle against corruption has not
generated nearly as much rage. We do not hear,
for example, any proposals for the imposition of
severe minimum mandatory prison terms upon
those convicted of involvement in a two hundred
million dollar securities fraud. Consequently, for
those who are involved in the administration of
justice, the reality is that the present harsh pro-
posals are designed to deal only with one segment
of the criminal society. And the full force of this
new criminal justice mandate will come to bear
only on those few who are unlucky enough to be
arrested, prosecuted and convicted.
As previously mentioned, these new proposals
for severe minimum mandatory prison sentences
will completely strip only the judge, who has the
duty to impose sentence, of his or her discretion.
Of course, if the proposed "no parole" provisions
are also enacted into law, the parole board will also
lose its discretion in the sense that such con-
victed persons will not be eligible for parole. The
elimination of plea bargaining will deprive the
prosecutor of only a part of his wide discretion.
But all other principals in the criminal justice
process will emerge with their discretion intact, but,
nevertheless, greatly influenced in exercising such
discretion by the existence of such severe manda-
tory penalties.
Consider the policeman on the beat who must
make street arrests of narcotics pushers large and
small. Unless the officer actually witnessed the
commission of the crime, he will be acting in many
instances upon information supplied to him by
informers. Based upon the information received,
the officer has the discretionary power to arrest,
and to conduct a limited search incident to an
[Vol. 64
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arrest1 ° The officer is told that he may only make
such an arrest if he has "probable cause" to believe
that a crime has been or is being committed.
In United States v. Harrisn the 'Burger Court"
considered for the first time what the new Chief
justice called "the recurring question of what
showing is constitutionally necessary to satisfy a
magistrate that there is a substantial basis for
crediting the report of an informant known to
the police, but not identified to the magistrate,
who purports to relate his personal knowledge of
criminal activity." 1
The sufficiency of the affidavit before the mag-
istrate in that case was upheld 5 to 4, with no
majority opinion. Since the same standards are
applied to determine whether a police officer had
"probable cause" to make a street arrest in the
first place and search incident thereto, it must be
said of the Court's opinion in Harris that police
officers, as well as the lower courts, are presently
without a Supreme Court opinion setting forth
clearly defined guidelines for crediting the in-
formation of an informer. As a result, the police
will often be wrong in making or not making an
arrest. In the former event, the policeman's basis
for arrest is reviewable by the judge. In the latter
event, it is not.
When a policeman fails to make an arrest he
should have made, it can be said that the police
officer improperly exercised his discretion in favor
of an accused person and against the interests of
society. In the former case, where an improper
arrest is made, it can be said that the officer
exercised his discretion against both the interests
of the accused and society. The individual will
have a record of arrest. Society's interests are
clearly not served by having persons improperly
arrested. However, in both cases, it can be said
that the officer's faulty actions stemmed from the
fact that he was inadequately guided in exercising
his discretion. In both cases it is possible that one
for whom the severe penalties were intended will
have escaped.
Those involved in law enforcement have long
recognized that even when certain crimes have
been committed in a police officer's presence he
sometimes exercises an assumed official discretion
10 See generally Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143
(1972); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969);
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
1"403 U.S. 573 (1971).
1 Id. at 574.
not to arrest. 3 The juvenile or young teenager
who puts a brick through a suburban school
window may be taken home by the police to his
parents and punished by school or family. The
ghetto child whose family cannot afford to pay to
repair a similarly broken school window is more
likely to receive the punishment of a juvenile or
youth court. From that policeman's point of view
the suburban child may be a troublemaker, the
ghetto teenager a juvenile delinquent. It may be a
good thing for a policeman to have such discretion,
but who has attempted to guide him in its exercise?
A policeman is obviously more tempted to assume
a discretion if the youngster will be facing a
severe minimum mandatory sentence for the of-
fense committed in the officer's presence.
The exercise of an inadequately guided discre-
tion in effecting arrests is much more common at
the local than at the federal level. The reason for
this is the difference in types of crimes which are
prosecuted within each area. City policemen must
deal with street crime and family offenses where
on-the-spot decisions are the rule.14 In the federal
system, most prosecutions are the result of in-
tensive investigations by administrative agencies
such as the SEC, and law enforcement agencies
like the FBI. Therefore, it is often agency person-
nel who exercise discretion in determining, after
investigation, which cases are to be referred for
possible criminal prosecution to the United States
Attorney. Federal narcotics arrests generally follow
investigation and surveillance of the accused by
Special Agents of the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) to whom the contra-
band is sold. The limitations of staff and money
make widescale prosecution of offenders impracti-
cal. Therefore, administrative agencies, as well as
the BNDD and FBI, tend to focus on what are
considered "key" or "strategic" cases or those in-
volving the most notorious or dangerous law
violators. The boundary between a "key" case
and a "not-so-key" case is obviously a very sub-
jective matter.
The fact that a person has been properly ar-
rested or charged with a crime does not mean that
1LAFAvE, Azu s--THE DEcisoN TO TAKE A
SUSPECT nTo CUSTODY 63 (1965); Goldstein, Police
Discretion Not to Invoke The Criminal Process; Low
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice,
69 YATY. L.J. 543, 547 (1960); Kadish, supra note 4;
Parnas, Police Discretion and Diversion of Incidents
of Intra-Family Violence, 36 LAW AND CONTEMSPORARY
PRo.vms 539 (1971).
14 Parnas, sgpra note 15.
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he will be prosecuted. A prosecutor has a wide
discretion in deciding in every category of crime
who will be prosecuted and who will not. The
average prosecutor's favorite discretionary device
for securing convictions in narcotics cases, as in
other types of criminal cases, is to use an arrestee
as an informant in exchange for a promise that
the arrestee will not be prosecuted, at least not
for the crime with which he has been charged.
Federal and state narcotics agents who make
arrests often use this discretionary device. Another
device is to name the arrestee as a co-conspirator
but not a defendant in the indictment. The co-
conspirator, as everyone in law enforcement
knows, is the one who is going to get everyone
else convicted by testifying for the government.
Recently, the head of the Criminal Division in
the office of the United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York issued a memoran-
dum to all Assistant United States Attorneys in
that office which provides that government at-
torneys have the discretion to permit a drug addict
to enter the Treatment Alternative to Street
Crime (TASC) program. 5 In addition, the memo-
randum describes the procedure to be followed by
one admitted to the program. If one admitted to
the treatment program is found in "satisfactory
status" after a year, the complaint against him is
dismissed. If, however, a defendant violates any
of the conditions of his release, the defendant is
rearraigned. Such deferred prosecutions apply to
all narcotics addicts.
Deferred prosecutions have long been afforded
juveniles arrested for any federal law violation.
The Probation Manual issued by the Administra-
tive Office of the United States Courts sets forth
the Deferred Prosecution Plan with respect to
juveniles.' The plan permits the government
attorney to defer prosecution of a "carefully se-
lected" juvenile and place him under the informal
supervision of a probation officer for a definite
period of time. The Judicial Conference has said
that the philosophy underlying the plan of de-
ferred prosecution,
... is based on the belief that very often it is
wiser not to prosecute juveniles at all, even as
juvenile delinquents; that in many instances,
11 United States Attorney's Office, Southern District
of New York, Criminal Division Memo. No. 9 (January
29, 1973), superseding in part Memo. No. 2 dated
April 26, 1971 (available in the offices of the J. Cizrm.
L. & C.).
16 Probation Manual, Chapter 9, PO-9.11 (December
1, 1961).
offenders are capable of correction without prosecu-
tion; and that if prior to trial and conviction such
juveniles are placed under supervision, prosecution
becomes unnecessary.... By such a procedure,
the juvenile is not stigmatized by a court record of
any kind.1 7
The Judicial Conference report found a patent
flaw in the deferred prosecution approach. The
plan was not codified and, as a result, allowed
prosecutors wide discretion in determining when
to initiate a deferred prosecution procedure. 8
To quote a 1967 Presidential Commission's
Task Force Report on prosecutors:
... the system for making the charge decision
remains generally inadequate. Prosecutors act
without the benefit of direction or guidelines from
either the legislature or higher levels of administra-
tion; their decisions are almost entirely free from
judicial supervision. Decisions are to a great extent
fortuitous because they are made on inadequate
information about the offense, the offender, and
the alternatives [to prosecution of the offender
which are] available.... Often cases are prosecuted
that should not be. Often offenders in need of
treatment, supervision, or discipline are set free
without being referred to appropriate community
agencies or followed up in any way. 19
Thus, the arrest of a suspect and the decision
to prosecute him are the first points of the criminal
process where authority is exercised largely with-
out rules. This same undisciplined exercise of
authority continues after prosecution of the ac-
cused begins. He remains subject to it until his
final release from the criminal justice system.
After a defendant is arrested and charged with
a crime, a determination is made as to whether he
shall be released on bail pending trial. Here again
some official's unguided or inadequately guided
discretion takes hold. Even under the present
federal Bail Reform Act,2 0 wide discretion still
resides in the magistrate or the trial judge in
determining what conditions of release are to be
set for a defendant who is not released on his own
recognizance or on an unsecured appearance bond.
The judicial officer may consider such things as
17 JUDIcIAL CONFERENCE or TEM UNITED STATES,
REPORT OF Tan COXMTTEE ON PROBATION WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE To JuvENILE DELINQUENCY
(August 21 1947).
'1 Id. at 7.
19 T1 PRESIDENT'S CoAnussIoN ON LAW E FORCE-
MIENT AND ADmINISTRATION OF JUsTicE-TAsK FORCE
REPORT: TE CouRTs 7 (1967).
20 Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-52 (1971).
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the defendant's family ties, his character and
mental condition, and his length of residence in
the community.21
Recent New York state proposals have included
a provision that with respect to persons arrested
and charged with narcotics law violations or the
use of violence while under the influence of drugs,
there shall be no plea bargaining or very strictly
limited plea bargaining.2'- If such provisions
should become law, they would indeed "cramp" the
prosecutor's "style" for securing many convic-
tions.
In the plea bargaining process, which ends in
the conviction of the defendant, there are no rules
or standards to govern the prosecutor's conduct,
other than the tactical and strategic considerations
which surround the performance of any difficult
job.23 In other words, the prosecutor's discretion
in negotiating plea bargains is virtually without
limit. However this discretion is exercised may
depend on the nature of the evidence and the
time constraints on the prosecutor's office rather
than on considerations of justice and fairness.
There are two other important dimensions to
the plea bargaining process which are worthy of
attention. First, successful plea bargaining by-
passes the trial process altogether. The courts,
more out of necessity than conviction, countenance
the waiver of basic constitutional rights by plead-
ing defendants. The effect which no trial has
upon sentencing can be tremendous. During the
course of a trial the government's proof as to all
charges is revealed to court and jury. The nature
and extent of defendant's involvement usually is
fully disclosed. The seriousness of the crime or
crimes committed by a defendant are put in
perspective. In the case of a guilty plea, the judge
usually hears only a brief summary of the prosecu-
tor's version of the facts.
The other important dimension of the plea
bargaining process is its effect as a sentencing
decision. Generally, it is thought, and legislatures
have so provided, that sentences should be im-
posed by judges.24 However, in most plea bargain-
ing arrangements, prosecutors exercise this very
21 Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §3146 (b) (1971).
2
2See note 2 supra.
2 See generally D. Nxwzwi, CoscnoN-THE
DETERMINATION OF GuiLT oR INNOcENcE XViTHOUT
TRIAL (1966); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in
Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cna. L. REv. 50, 54 (1968);
Note, Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial
Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956).2 FED. R. Carar P., 32 (a); CAL. PENAL CoDE § 1193
(West 1970); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-5-3 (1973).
function. 25 The reduction of charges, which is the
quid pro quo for the defendant's plea of guilty,
often effects a reduction in the maximum penalty
which may be imposed on the defendant by the
judge. In the Federal District Court for the South-
ern District of New York, this is generally the
only effect of the plea bargain, since prosecutors
are not given an opportunity to make specific
sentencing recommendations. In the state courts,
it is often otherwise. That is, a plea bargain may
be a trade of a guilty plea for a specific sentencing
disposition with which the state judge will nor-
really concur. Of course, where, as is often the
case in state courts, a defendant fails to make
bail and remains in prison for a substantial amount
of time pending trial, trial and sentencing become
unnecessary altogether. At a certain point, the
defendant's guilty plea to reduced charges will
mean a sentence for the time he has already served.
In such situations, it is at the original bail hearing
that the sentencing decision is effectively made.
Thus, since it is the prosecutor who decides whether
or not to reach a plea bargain with each individual
defendant, it is the prosecutor who controls to a
great extent the harshness of the sentence.
The federal system protects a defendant on
trial in a criminal case fairly effectively from ar-
bitrariness during the trial by providing for appeal
in every criminal case.26 However, jurors can and
do exercise their virtually unfettered power,
which is not subject to review, to protect de-
fendants from what the jurors believe may be
excessively harsh punishment under the law. The
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently
reminded us that "... the jury has 'power to
bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and
facts.' "2 Although jury acquittals in narcotics
cases in our court are uncommon, minimum man-
datory penalties of ten years or life in prison can
only have the effect of making such acquittals
more frequent. The disparate circumstances of
each case and the varying quantities of narcotics
involved make it clear that the jury is more likely
than not to consider such penalties too harsh in
25 D. NEwmAN, supra note 24, at 188-92; Lambros,
Plea Bargaining and the Sentencing Process, 53 F.R.D.
509, 513 (1971); Comment, Official Inducements to
Plead Guilty: Suggested Morals for a Marketplace, 32
U. Cwr. L. R1v. 167 (1962).26 FED. R. Cmdr. P., 37.
27 United States v. Marchese, 438 F.2d 452, 455 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1012 (1971). The Court




those cases involving mitigating circumstances
and small quantities of narcotics.
Presently under federal law a person convicted
of selling heroin or cocaine may be sentenced by
the trial judge to a term of imprisonment up to
fifteen years.28 In addition, a fine up to $25,000
may be imposed. The sentence may be suspended.
And the defendant sentenced to prison under the
federal statute is eligible for parole after he has
served one-third of his sentence, just as in the
case of all other federal sentences.2 9 If a prison
term is imposed and not suspended, the judge
must impose a parole term of not less than three
years to follow any such term. In the case of any
second or subsequent offense, where a prison term
is imposed, the judge must impose a special
parole term of not less than six years.30
On April 3, 1973, the Senate passed a bill which
would require a judge to impose in the case of a
second narcotics offender a minimum mandatory
sentence of ten years." He could impose more
than ten years. The proposed maximum provided
by the bill is thirty years. The minimum manda-
tory sentence of ten years must be imposed in
addition to the sentence of up to fifteen years
which may be imposed for that second offense.
Such a double sentence is to be imposed in those
cases where the defendanthad been previously con-
victed, on or after the effective date of the proposed
new law, of illegally manufacturing, distributing or
dispensing one-tenth of an ounce of pure heroin
or morphine, or its equivalent, and who, at the
time he committed such violation, was not an
addict. A person who had been so previously
convicted is declared a "public menace." The
statute further provides that if a person is found
guilty of a third narcotics violation and has been
previously convicted of selling one-tenth of an
ounce of pure heroin or morphine and previously
sentenced as a public menace, such defendant
shall be sentenced, in addition to the sentence
imposed of up to fifteen years, to life imprison-
ment. The imposition and execution of any such
additional sentence may not be suspended and
probation shall not be granted. However, any
persons sentenced to life imprisonment may be
released on parole after serving not less than thirty
28 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1972).
29 18 U.S.C.A. § 4202 (1969).
80 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1972).
"1 S.800, as amended, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. § 601
(1973), reproduced at 119 CoNG. REc. S6565 (1973).
years of his life sentence. Moreover, in no case
shall any such additional term of imprisonment,
including a life sentence imposed pursuant to
these proposed provisions, run concurrently with
any term of imprisonment imposed for such
violation.
Prior to enactment of the present law 2 in
October, 1970 providing for the sentencing of
narcotics law violators, i.e. sellers and distributors,
to a term of imprisonment of up to fifteen years,
federal law provided for the imposition of minimum
mandatory sentences in such cases-five years
for the first offense and ten years for the second
or any subsequent offense. 3 The harshness of the
mandatory feature of those old provisions, to-
gether with the "no suspension-no parole" features
led judges and law reform groups to seek more
flexibility. In opposing the bill which was passed
by the Senate on April 3, 1973, and which seeks
to reinstitute minimum mandatory penalties for
second and third offenders, Senator Ervin of North
Carolina had this to say:
I am opposed to this amendment for two
reasons. In the first place, I do not believe that
the institution of mandatory minimum sentences
will be effective in deterring these crimes or insur-
ing proper punishment for the guilty. Experience
shows and logic demonstrates that mandatory sen-
tences in some cases actually encourage prosecu-
tors to dismiss or break down charges to lesser
offenses and encourage judges and juries to
acquit the guilty. If a judge or jury believes the
mandatory sentence does not fit the defendant
under the circumstances, acquittal will be a great
temptation.
The second objection I have to mandatory
minimum sentences is the unfortunate restrictions
they place upon the discretion of judges. Although,
like other Americans, I do not always agree with
the way in which judges exercise their traditional
discretion in sentencing, I strongly believe in
preserving this flexibility built into our system of
criminal justice. It is the trial judge, not Con-
gress, which hears all of the evidence, observes
firsthand the particular defendant, and becomes
acquainted with his background through the
presentencing report. Mandatory sentences de-
prive trial judges of discretion to make the punish-
ment fit the crime and the criminal. 4
"2 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Con-
trol Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1972).
13 Opium Poppy Control Act of 1942, ch. 720, § 13,
56 Stat. 1045.




I believe that the sentencing of criminals is the
most significant decision made by judges. Here, as
my colleague, the Honorable judge Marvin E.
Frankel, has so brilliantly discussed in his book
Crimnl Sentences,"5 there are virtually no stan-
dards to guide the judge's decision. In the federal
system, there is presently no review of sentences.
Yet the sentence decision has an effect which is
more tangible and significant to the defendant
than any other decision in the criminal process.
Being arrested may have varying consequences
for a person. Even being prosecuted may not in
the end substantially change a person's life. But
being sentenced to prison for a substantial period
of time must have for the condemned a finality
second only to death. The difference between re-
ceiving a suspended sentence with no prison term
and going to prison for ten years is capable of
conception only by the man who has been sen-
tenced to such a term knowing that another person
similarly convicted received two years or even a
suspended sentence. Ten years is most often the
maximum range of a sentence which a federal
trial judge may impose. Narcotics cases are among
the exceptions. And except for the maximum as
defined by statute, the decision may be more or
less an arbitrary one.
The presentence report" is supposed to aid the
judge in determining what the sentence shall be,
but apart from advising the judge of the defend-
ant's prior criminal record, the report usually
furnishes no other truly objective guides to sen-
tencing. A defendant's background, family life,
hobbies, employment record; and military record,
may be guides, but they are personal value judg-
ments in the sentencing process. The weight to be
given these vague attributes will vary from judge
to judge. The seriousness of the crime committed
is manifestly a major consideration in any sen-
tence, but what may be serious to a judge in Kansas
may not be equally serious to a judge in New York
and vice versa. Likewise, even judges in the same
court may disagree as to the seriousness of a
particular offense.
In June 1972, a Senate Committee on Criminal
Law and Procedure was furnished a study of
sentences in federal courts over a four-year period,
1967-1970, which showed considerable variation
in length of sentences both within and between
judicial districts. It also showed some interesting
variations in length of sentences as between whites
35 See M. FRANK.EL, supra note 4.
36 FED. R. Cm P., 32(c)(2).
and blacks. In interstate theft cases, for example,
28 percent of white defendants received prison
sentences as opposed to 48 percent for blacks. In
postal theft cases it was 39 percent for whites as
opposed to 48 percent for blacks. For fiscal year
1970 the Federal Bureau of Prisons reported that
the average length of sentences for white federal
prisoners was 42.9 months as compared to 57.5
months for blacks."
Last year, the United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York made a study of
sentences over a six-month period, May-October
1972, in the Southern District court. Although he
found no differentiation in sentencing in that court
as between blacks and whites, he did find that only
36 percent of the white collar criminals who were
convicted went to jail as opposed to 53 percent of
those convicted for non-violent common crimes'
There is another reason, as I have suggested,
why the sentencing function of judges is so signifi-
cant. The fact is that few of those who are charged
with crime actually go to trial. Indeed, only a small
minority of defendants assert their constitutional
right to a jury trial. The vast majority enter
pleas of guilty. Consequently, the only substantial
role of a judge in a case where the defendant pleads
guilty is at the time of sentencing.
Once a defendant is convicted and then sen-
tenced by a judge, the defendant enters another
stage of the criminal justice system: prison life.
Here the criminal defendant is once again at the
mercy of officials who exercise power and authority
largely without rules.
The subjection of prisoners to arbitrary deci-
sions of prison officials was well illustrated in the
case of Sostre v. Rockefeller,41 which was before me
three years ago, and in the case of Morales v.
Schmidt," which was before Federal judge Doyle
7 EPORT or THE NATioNAL INsTrrurz rOR LAW
ENPORCEMENT AND CnaNAL JusTiCE, as summarized
in "Southern District of New York Sentencing Study"
at 3-4 (Memorandum from United States Attorney,
Southern District of New York, tW Judges of the
Second Circuit and Southern District of New York,
Mimeograph dated January 10, 1973) (available from
the offices of the J. Cam. L. & C.).
8 STATISTicAL REPORT FOR FiscAL YE A 1970, as
quoted in "Southern District of New York Sentencing
Study," supra note 38.
39"Southern District of New York Sentencing
Study," supra note 38.
40 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a.ffd., modified,
and rev'd in part sub. mom., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442
F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (En banc), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1049 (1972).
a 340 F. Supp. 544 (W.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd. and re-
maned, - F.2d - (7th Cir. 1973).
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of the Western District of Wisconsin last year.
Sostre petitioned my court for release from solitary
confinement which he had endured for over a year.
The evidence established that Sostre was treated
in this way "not because of any serious infraction
of the rules of prison discipline, or even for any
minor infraction, but because Sostre was being
punished specially by the Warden" for his legal
and political activities and beliefs.
There was little difficulty in finding an ostensibly
legitimate excuse for sending Sostre into solitary
confinement. The Warden could rely on such broad
prison rules as the following-that an inmate obey
orders "promptly and fully." Another rule pro-
vided that inmates answer all questions put to
them by prison officials "fully and truthfully." 4
The New York Correction Law at the time au-
thorized wardens to commit prisoners to solitary
confinement in their absolutely unfettered discre-
tion,4 when necessary to produce the prisoner's en-
tire submission and obedience. The prisoner could
be kept there "until he shall [have been] reduced to
submission." The statute was changed in 1970
without really affecting the scope of the warden's
discretion. Now wardens "may keep any inmate
confined ... [separately] ... for such period as




The decision to punish a prisoner in this way
may be made by a prison warden without formal
proceedings. The warden is only required to afford
the prisoner a "reasonable opportunity to explain
his actions." 4' And this is the case despite the
fact that the placement of a prisoner in solitary
confinement is often "dehumanizing in the sense
that it is needlessly degrading." 47
In Morales, Judge Doyle said:
With respect to the intrinsic importance of
the challenges [i.e., to the prison system], I am
persuaded that the institution of prison probably
must end. In many respects it is as intolerable
within the United States as was the institution
of slavery, equally brutalizing to all involved,
equally toxic to the social system, equally sub-
versive of the brotherhood of man, even more
costly by some standards, and probably less ra-
tional. 8
42 312 F. Supp. at 869.
4Id. at 871.
44 Correction Law, § 140 (McKinney 1970).
48 Correction Law, § 137 (McKinney 1972).
48 Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178,198 (2d Cir.
1971) (En banc), cert. denied., 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
' 312 F. Supp. at 868.
48 Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp. 544, 548-49
Aside from the vagaries of prison life, prisoners
are also subject to the totally unguided discretion
of parole officials. In the parole system, we again
find the exercise of authority without rules or
standards to channel the decision-making func-
tion. At a First and Second Circuit Sentencing
Institute in January, 1973, a member of the United
States Board of Parole frankly admitted that he
knew of no specific criteria by which the Board
made its determinations.
It is therefore easy to understand the descrip-
tion which the federal parole board has given of
its operations in one of its official booklets:
Voting is done on an individual basis by each
member and the Board does not sit as a group for
this purpose. Each member studies the prisoner's
file and places his name on the official order form
to signify whether he wishes to grant or deny
parole. The reasoning and thought which led to
his vote are not made a part of the order, and it is
therefore impossible to state precisely why a
particular prisoner was or was not granted parole.49
Of course, there is no way to explain disparities
in results, when there are no definable standards
by which specific results are reached.
SOME VIEWS ON BRINGING LAW AND ORDER TO THE
SENTENCING PROCESS
The preceding observations bring us to the
second part of this analysis-some views on what
might be done to bring more law and order to the
sentencing process. It is said that criminal penal-
ties are imposed by society for any one or more of
five purposes:50
1) for retribution or revenge against the wrong-
doer;
2) for preventive detention-to restrain the
wrongdoer during his confinement;
3) for specific or individual deterrence-that is,
to discourage the wrongdoer from committing
crimes after his release;
4) for general deterrence-to deter others
from the same illegal conduct; and
5) to rehabilitate or reform the wrongdoer.
Our present system of sentencing is concededly
rather ineffective in accomplishing the latter
three purposes. The first two--retribution against
and detention of a very small minority of wrong-
doers-the system does seem to be accomplishing.




FumcTioNs OF THE UNITED STATES BoARD OF
PAaoLE 4-5 (1964).
60 M. FRANxEL, supra note 4, at 106.
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The reason that the sentencing system has
such limited effectiveness in curbing crime seems
to be that our society has not and will not commit
the required resources to ameliorate the social
conditions which breed criminal conduct and to
"habilitate" or "rehabilitate" major law violators.
Indeed, it does appear that no amount of money
for improving social conditions will be effective as
long as crime pays so well.
This is particularly true of the narcotics traffic.
The convictions of narcotics agents and police
officers for selling hard drugs tell us that no
amount of money spent on better housing and
better schools and better prisons will reduce the
number of narcotics sellers as long as there are
millions to be made in a society where it appears
that only money counts. The problem of the
illegal sale of narcotics is not to be solved by
harsher and harsher penalties for pushers but by
taking the profit out of selling narcotics. Our
energies should therefore be devoted to finding
ways to accomplish this end. If we find this solu-
tion, then one problem which has moved us
frantically back to the severe minimum mandatory
penalties concept will have vanished.
We will, nevertheless, be left with the realiza-
tion that our society is not committed to a more
rapid elimination of the crime breeding syndrome
or the remaking of a criminal. With this in mind,
it seems to me that we should candidly face the
fact that the only purposes that a sentence serves
are retribution, preventive detention, and some-
times individual deterrence. If this is correct, if
these are the only purposes, then the mandatory
sentence advocates have won a new adherent.
However, my agreement with the mandatory
penalty school is very limited and is forced by the
disheartening reality which I have cited.
'First, I believe that mandatory penalties should
be graduated, relatively short, and imposed only
in conjunction with a system which grants every
first offender a suspended sentence and an ap-
propriate period of probation, with an exception
for certain particularly heinous offenses such as
premeditated murder and consumer poisoning. In
the case of monetary frauds, first offenders should,
in addition, be required to make restitution. After
the first offense, a short mandatory prison term of
up to one year, which has been legislatively de-
fined for each crime, would be imposed. If there
are exceptional or unusual mitigating circum-
stances, such as the imminent death of the de-
fendant or his providing crucial testimony for the
government, a suspended sentence may be recom-
mended by the sentencing judge whose written
recommendation and reasons therefor must receive
the approval of a reviewing panel. For the third
offense, a much longer mandatory sentence of up
to three years for each crime would be legislatively
provided, with the same provisions for a suspended
sentence. For the fourth offense, again, a longer
mandatory sentence of five years would be pro-
vided, with the same provisions for suspended
sentence. The fifth offender would be mandatorily
sentenced to a term of five years. A similar manda-
tory sentence of five years would then be imposed
for every offense thereafter.
For heinous crimes like murder, first offenders
would receive a mandatory sentence which would
vary according to the category of crime committed.
Second offenders would receive very long manda-
tory sentences, depending on the crimes involved.
Again, sentences could be suspended by the sen-
tencing judge, but such suspensions would be
subject to review.
This system contemplates that parole boards
would continue to exist only for the release of
prisoners for a compelling humanitarian reason.
Of course, those who are judged mentally in-
competent would be referred for treatment or
confined in institutions if they can not be treated
and are dangerous to themselves or others.
Juveniles, youth offenders, and young adult
offenders up to the age of twenty-six would con-
tinue to be treated the way they presently are
treated in the federal system.a The judge would
continue to have the power to treat young people
as such, suspend the sentences up to the age of
twenty-six, and commit them for study and treat-
ment.u2
This system also contemplates that all victim-
less crimes such as alcoholism, drug use, and non-
organized prostitution would be removed from
the criminal justice system entirely and placed
within a treatment system. It also contemplates
that all gambling would be legalized.
In sum, we must take a fresh look at our criminal
sentences to rationalize their purpose, to bring
order to the system, and to eliminate meaningless
disparities.
The proposal which I have just made may be
restated in a simplified manner like this:
First, no person should be sentenced to prison
5118 U.S.C. § 4209 (1969).




for a first offense, except for the most blameworthy
offenses, such as premeditated murder.
Second, judges should have no discretion,
except as indicated, in actually sentencing de-
fendants to prison. The sentence should be specifi-
cally prescribed in each case by the legislature.
Third, suspended sentences should be strictly
limited and subject to review.
Fourth, the length of sentence should depend
exclusively on the number of times a person has
been convicted of a crime and the seriousness of
those crimes.
Fifth, after the first offense, imprisonment
should be for a short, definite term, perhaps six
months on the average and for a maximum of one
year depending on the seriousness of the crime,
with increasingly longer sentences to be imposed
after the second offense.
Sixth, victimless crimes would not be dealt
with by the traditional criminal justice system.
Since punishment and individual deterrence are
the purposes of the sentence, all other punishment,
such as the imposition of lawless punishment on
prisoners and the denial of employment to them
after their release, should be eliminated.
The combination of these six considerations
would create a sentencing regime with less un-
guided discretion residing in the trial judge, where
the goal in dealing with youths and first offenders
would be to reintegrate them into society, rather
than to punish or segregate them, where imprison-
ment. for any more than a year would be reserved
only for intractable offenders, and where the
stated purposes of imprisonment would be to
punish the individual offender and to deter him
from committing further crimes.
Such a system would have several salutary
effects. Most importantly, it would eliminate the
lawless discretion which is now exercised by judges.
To say that a judge through the exercise of his
presently uncharted discretion can in every case
fashion punishment to fit not only the crime, but
the individual, is to say that a judge is not only
ordained by God but that he is God.
Second, it would eliminate gross disparities in
sentencing. In nearly all categories of cases, federal
judges as a group show little consistency in sen-
tencing practices. The different treatment that
similar offenders get has no objective basis in law,
nor is it necessarily a reflection of any differences
between the offenders or the crimes they have
committed. The disparity in sentencing in cases
such as draft evasion is purely and simply a func-
tion of the judges who impose the sentence. As
Judge Frankel has put it, "Sentences [are] not so
much in terms of defendants, but mainly in terms
of the wide spectrums of character, bias, neurosis,
and daily vagary encountered among occupants
of the trial bench." 1
just like the parole boards which I mentioned a
few moments ago, federal judges are not required
to articulate the underlying reasons for sentences
which they impose. judges have neither adequate
information nor sufficient time or training to
make a meaningful disposition of every individual
defendant's case. Even with more information
and more specific sentencing standards, judges
would be acting according to their own predilec-
tions in most cases, since the criteria would neces-
sarily be vague and a few factors among many
relevant factors could always be cited to support a
particular sentencing determination.
There is a more serious flaw in the present
system of limitless discretion. Discretion is only
exercised usefully when it is exercised to ac-
complish a particular purpose. In the case of
sentencing, discretion is thought to be a salutary
tool in the hands of judges because it enables them
to decide the appropriate treatment for different
offenders. This would make sense if the prison
system did anything more than isolate convicts
and punish them. In fact, however, this is all the
prison system does and, I would venture to say,
this is about all that any prison system is ever
likely to accomplish. Since punishment and deten-
tion are all that prisons can accomplish, there is
no sense to allowing discretion in the sentencing
process. If the purpose of sentencing discretion is
to maximize the goal of individual deterrence, the
present system is likewise inappropriate.
Punishment is only an effective device for alter-
ing conduct if it is applied fairly and as a direct
sanction for the conduct which is sought to be
punished. Under the present sentencing system,
however, punishment is not dispensed fairly be-
cause judges mete out punishment according to
their own subjective and undisciplined standards.
Nor is punishment always a direct sanction for
illegal conduct under the present sentencing
system. Punishment is often imposed not so much
for the specific offense which the defendant has
committed as because of the defendant's social
background, his failure to have a job, or his lack
of education. When punishment is imposed in this
3M. FPAWux., supra note 4, at 21.
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manner, it loses its force as a symbol of society's
disapproval of the defendant's criminal conduct.
Instead, the punishment tells the defendant that
society disapproves of him, that his character is
deficient. The defendant knows that the kind of
treatment he receives from the criminal process is
not primarily a function of the crime which he has
committed. It is more likely to be a reflection of
the judge's estimate of him as a person.
It is fair to say that the individualized prison
sentence is the first blow to a defendant's integrity
and self-esteem in a process which, through the
prison and parole regime, will deal him many more
blows before his release. By punishing the de-
fendant for what he is, rather than for what he
has done, some sentencers loosen what may al-
ready be a fragile tie between the defendant and
society. By the end of a substantial prison term,
the tie may be irrevocably broken.
The proposed system, unlike the present one,
might even make sense to the offender who
then might gain respect for the rule of law. And
it might, in the long run, reduce crime by reinte-
grating offenders into society rather than dis-
integrating them in our prisons. Any honest ob-
server of the present sentencing process, the prison
system, and crime statistics would have to agree
that the time for a change of approach has come.
In his book Criminal Sentences,54 judge Frankel
proposes a middle course between the mandatory
sentence concept which I have proposed and the
present system. His tentative suggestion is to
51 M. FRANxEL, supra note 4. For other sentencing
proposals, see Au. B. Ass'N. PROJECT ON MIDMEM
STANDARDS FOR JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES (1968); NATIONAL CoUN-
CIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENcY, MODEL SENTENCING
AcT (1963).
control the judge's discretion without eliminating
it entirely. The control mechanisms would include
a codification of sentencing factors which the
judge would be required to weigh in determining
the sentence to be imposed in each individual case.
A "detailed chart or calculus" would be used and
the sentence would be subject to review by ap-
pellate courts." Judge Frankel candidly notes,
however, that similar efforts "have been made
without notable success in the past." 1 The sys-
tem as applied by judges might not in the end
differ much from the present one. At the same time,
it would create virtually insurmountable technical
problems and uncertainties, since the calculus
being applied would be complex, subjective and
constantly under attack by various groups.
I would suggest that if we are to move in a new
direction, a truly different approach should be
tried. The proposal I have outlined seems to have
the virtues of simplicity and easy applicability.
It would also bring to the system a certainty of
punishment for would-be offenders. The deterrent
effect of certainty might also be salutary.
We know very little about how to deal with our
crime problem and the American public has made
notably little effort to improve the situation by
dealing with the realities of the problem. Perhaps,
therefore, making the sentencing process fairer and
limiting its claimed purposes are the necessary
first steps of reform of the criminal justice system.
This is one of many steps which are needed. But
it is the beginning of a "law and order" approach
to the problem of lawlessness in the criminal
justice system.
55 M. FRANMEL, supra note 4, at 113.
56Id. at 114.
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